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Pay Enough-Or Don't Pay At All
Uri Gneezy** and Aldo Rustichini***
May 1998
Abstract: Economics seems largely based on the assumption that monetary incentives
improve performance. By contrast, a large literature in psychology, including a rich
tradition of experimental work, claims just the opposite. In this paper we present and
discuss a set of experiments designed to test the effect of different monetary
compensations on performance.
In our experiments we find that whenever money is offered, a larger amount yields
a higher performance. It isnot true, however, that offering money always induces a higher
performance: participants who were offered a small payoff gave a worse performance than
those who were offered no compensation at all. These results suggest that the behavior of
participants is influenced by their perception of the contract that is offered to them. When
the contract offers money the environment is perceived as monetary, and participants
respond in a qualitatively different way in monetary and non-monetary environments.
In a different set of experiments we test subjects who, acting as principals, have to
provide the appropriate incentive to agents. We show that principals do not anticipate the
drastic difference in behavior. The vast majority of principals seem to think incorrectly that
a larger compensation is unambiguously a better incentive.
Keywords:     Monetary incentives, performance, motivation, principal-agent.
JEL Codes: D1, D8, D9.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A major problem facing most principals is how to set the incentives for their
workers right in order to improve performance. A great deal of discussion is devoted to
this question in two different fields: economics and psychology. The literature in the two
fields seems to make opposite statements on the effect of monetary incentives on
performance. Economics is largely based on the assumption that monetary incentives
improve performance.1 On the other hand a large body of literature in psychology,
including a rich tradition of experimental work, claim just the opposite. In this paper we
present and discuss a set of experiments designed to test specifically the effect of monetary
compensation on performance. On the basis of our results we argue that both claims are,
for different reasons, correct.
In the results of our experiments the performance, and so presumably the effort, of
the agents is not monotonically increasing in the amount of monetary compensation offered
to them, even when the amount paid is increasing with the performance. This observation
seems to confirm the claim in the psychology literature that money may have detrimental
effects on motivation. On the other hand we observe that conditionally on the fact that
money is offered, more money does induce a larger effort.
It seems important to determine the reason for these seemingly contradictory
observations. Here we anticipate a tentative explanation, based on our results. An
experimental environment  (just as, presumably, a real life environment) defines a contract
for the individuals. Our results suggest that the critical element in determining their
                                                  
1 There are, however, interesting exceptions to this rule, some of which are recent: for instance see the
work of Titmuss (1970), Arrow (1972), Frey (1994), Frey, Oberholzer  and  Eichenberger, (1996), and
Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, (1997).
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behavior is their perception of the contract they are facing. If we compare situations in
which a monetary compensation is offered, then we see that a higher compensation induces
a higher effort.2 On the other hand, a contract that does not mention contingent payoffs
may induce an effort higher than the one induced by a contract offering only a modest
amount of contingent payoff. In the first case subjects perceive the contract as defining a
monetary environment, and choose the effort comparing the monetary reward with the
disutility produced by the effort.
This explanation is in the spirit of the “fair wage” hypothesis. Akerlof (1982) and
Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 1990) argue that fairness-oriented behavior of workers may lead
to involuntary unemployment. The main assumption they make is that a positive
relationship between work effort and wages exist. Given this relationship, It may be
profitable for employers to pay more than the market clearing wages.
2. RELATED LITERATURE
The evidence we described and the tentative explanation we have offered differ in
an important way from those offered in the psychology literature. So, before we proceed to
present and discuss our experiments and results, we review some of the evidence and
analysis in that literature.
The ''hidden cost of reward''.
                                                                                                                                                      
2 We would like to note that we mean payoffs which are contingent on performance, and not payoffs
which are given as show-up fee.
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The theme of the ''hidden cost of reward'' appears explicitly in the psychology
literature in the early seventies: it is also the title of a famous book collecting essays in the
topic (Lepper and Greene, 1978). This line of research began as reaction of the new trend
of cognitive psychology to the dominant behaviorist paradigm. To understand the reasons
for this new development it is useful to recall that, according to the classical conditioning,
an activity in itself neutral or even mildly unpleasant but positively rewarded may
eventually acquire the positive valence of the reward. In this case, past reward has in the
long run a positive effect on the performance of that activity. In fact from a strictly
behaviorist point of view motivation in itself has no meaning: the only scientifically relevant
(and observable) aspect are behavior, and the relation between reward and behavior. The
main prediction of the behaviorist theory is that the performance of some particular task is
increased if in the past it has been repeatedly associated with positive rewards.
Intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation.
The cognitive approach offered an alternative view: an activity has a motivation of
its own, independent of any reward, which was called intrinsic motivation.  An operational
definition of this concept is easy: we may say that an activity is intrinsically motivated if it
is performed when there is no external reward associated with it. A conceptual definition is
not that easy. For instance, Deci (1975) defines intrinsically motivated behaviors, as those
in which a person engages to feel competent and self-determining. A full discussion of the
reasons for such a definition would take us far from our purposes, so we refer the reader to
the book of Deci (1975).
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The focus of the literature became soon the question: do rewards (or any extrinsic
motivation) reduce intrinsic motivation? The importance of this question is clear: a ''hidden
cost of reward'' (that is, a reduction in the intrinsic motivation following a reward) was a
powerful way for cognitive psychologists to show that the basic assumption of behaviorism
was flawed. A rather large set of experiments showed that a reduction was indeed taking
place.
Experimental evidence in the literature
As an illustration we may consider the classic experiment reported in Deci (1971).
He had college students play with a puzzle (called  "Soma"), in three succeeding sessions.
In the first session participants were left to play freely with a puzzle. In the second session,
one group received payment conditional on the solution of the puzzle and the control
group did not. In a third session the subjects were then left to play freely with the puzzles.
The amount of time spent in the free activity performed in the first and third session was
taken as a measure of intrinsic motivation. Deci found that the experimental group spent
less time playing with the puzzle in the third session than the control group, and concluded
that the reward offered had decreased the intrinsic motivation of subjects in the first group.
In the following years a rich set of experiments was conducted to further test the
effect of rewards on intrinsic motivation. It is important to note that these experiments
were trying to test the effect of past reward on future motivation. (Our experiment, on the
other hand, will focus on the effect of a reward on present performance.) The main findings
of these experiments were:
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(i) Positive rewards, in particular monetary rewards, have a negative effect on intrinsic
motivation. If a person is rewarded for doing an interesting activity his intrinsic motivation
decreases. But also the converse was true: if a person is insufficiently rewarded for
performing a dull activity his intrinsic motivation increases.
(ii) The negative effect is significant only if the reward is contingent on the performance;
the subjects who are paid a fixed positive amount, independent of their performance do not
display reduction in intrinsic motivation. The same happens if subjects are informed of the
fact that a reward will be paid only after they have performed the activity (so that they
were not expecting the reward at the moment of performing it).
(iii) A positive feedback, provided by sentences like: "Very good, that's the fastest this one
has been done yet", has positive effects on intrinsic motivation. Conversely a negative
feedback ("Well, most people were able to solve this one, but let's go on to the next") has a
negative effect  (Deci, Cascio and Krusell, 1973).
On two issues this literature was silent. First, there is no attempt to determine
precisely if the motivation is task-specific or environment-specific. For instance, in the
experiments reported in Deci (1971) that we have already mentioned one might wonder if
the subjects, left alone with a completely different type of puzzle, would still display the
reduction of intrinsic motivation. This might be observed if the subjects that had been
promised a payment in the first session displayed less activity on the new puzzle, compared
to the control group. If they did, one might conjecture that the subjects were originally
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motivated to produce effort in the situation created by the experiment, irrespective of the
specific task: this would be evidence of an environment-specific motivation. Suppose on
the other hand that they did not: then it would be natural to conjecture that the motivation
was attached to that specific task (the "Soma" puzzle, in this instance). In fact most of this
literature seems to assume implicitly that the motivation is task specific. The distinction is
important if one wants to understand precisely how wide in scope and persistent in time are
the effects of rewards on motivation and performance.
Second, very little attention was given to the performance, rather than motivation,
of the subjects in the different treatments. The work by Kruglansky, Freedman, and Zeevi
(1971) is a partial exception: a group of teenagers was asked to perform several tasks, and
some of them were promised a reward (presumably positive) consisting of a guided tour of
the psychology department of a nearby university. The performance of the rewarded
students was lower.
The theory: Self-perception and attribution theories.
A brief sketch of the theory provided as an explanation of this evidence may be
helpful to complete the picture. A widely accepted explanation was based on the cognitive
approach. According to this approach a subject may use external evidence to find a reason
for his own actions. In a process called later attribution a subject associates his own
observed behavior to a motivation. The original idea of attribution goes back to Heider
(1958). According to Heider, a person constantly tries to understand the world as
something non-random. In this process, he tries to link every event, including his own
behavior, to the conditions that underlie it.
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A development of the original idea of Heider is in Bem's Self-Perception Theory
(see Bem 1965 and 1967). The main idea is that subjects, in order to explain their own
behavior, use the evidence they have as any outside observer would do. In particular if
subjects see that they do an activity when they have been offered a monetary incentive,
they explain their motivation as provided by that monetary incentive. Deci formulated the
application of this idea to the analysis of the effect of rewards as the "overjustification
hypothesis" (Deci 1971): when some external factor (like some compensation) is added, it
is likely that the subjects will attribute the motivation to that factor.  So when offered, a
reward replaces the intrinsic motivation which then becomes less important. When the
extrinsic motivation is removed, this reduction in the intrinsic motivation produces a
reduced effort.
All the findings we have briefly reported are consistent with this cognitive
evaluation theory.  For instance the evidence that larger rewards have larger and negative
effects may be explained as a consequence of the discounting principle, (see Kelley 1967
and 1971). The principle states that when behavior occurs in presence of several multiple
causes, then the attribution of the behavior to these different causes is less than it would be
if only one or fewer of these causes were present.
Another explanation was provided along the lines of Festinger's cognitive
dissonance theory (see Festinger, 1957). A subject who is doing a dull task may, to reduce
the dissonance created by observing himself doing something uninteresting, convince
himself that the task is attractive, and therefore increase the intrinsic motivation.
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The line of research we have briefly discussed addresses an extremely ambitious
question, which is in fact the same as the behaviorist school was addressing: "How do
rewards affect behavior in the long-run?" If we use concepts and definitions more familiar
to economists or decision theorists, the question may be formulated as "How are
preferences over consequences affected by past experiences?" For most of this literature
the object of study is the long-run effect of rewards. It is important to note that the
rewards were very rarely repeated in the experiments we described. This attracted a
criticism from the behaviorist side of the experimental evidence provided by the cognitive
school on effects of rewards on motivation (see for instance Reiss and Sushinsky (1975a
and 1975b)). They pointed out that a proper analysis of these effects on the long run would
require an extended series of reinforcements rather than single-trial reinforcement.
Experimental economics: the Dominance condition.
The issue of the effect of monetary compensation on the behavior of subjects marks
of course a major distinction between the experimental methods in psychology and
economics. For economists, a monetary payoff is a very important requirement, which is
needed to give to the experimenter the control over the environment of the experiment.
The monetary payoff offered to the subject must be sufficient to overcome the subjective
factors, which are difficult to evaluate and extraneous to the theory. This is the dominance
condition (see Smith (1982)). A quantitative condition for dominance is that the payoff
must be large enough to insure that the reward corresponding to the experimental
hypothesis are ''perceptibly and motivationally greater'' than the rewards corresponding to
the alternative hypothesis. A qualitative condition is, however, that the subjective factors
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are independent of the monetary payoffs. Our results suggest that this assumption of
independence between monetary payoffs and subjective factors may typically not be
satisfied. In particular, this would put in doubt the extension of some results, obtained with
zero monetary payoffs, to situations where the payoffs are strictly positive.
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
In this paper we address the issue of the effect of incentives on performance, rather
than motivation. In addition we set up this test in an environment which is quantitatively
precise, and perhaps more precisely defined.
Our experiments were designed to test two basic assumptions, which seem widely
accepted among economists. First, in standard economic theory preferences over outcomes
are assumed to be independent of the environment in which the person operates, and in
particular from the contract offered. To illustrate this assumption we may consider our IQ
test experiments: subjects were asked to answer questions out of an IQ questionnaire, and
were then informed about their performance, and are paid money or not accordingly. The
relevant outcomes for the subject here are the effort and time, the possible entertainment
value of answering the questions, the opinion of the people who will know his results, and
so on. Second, a basic assumption of an economist in this situation would probably be that,
since money is a good, if two contracts only differ in the amount of money paid for an
observed performance, the contract offering a higher amount of money conditional on a
better performance should induce a higher effort and as a consequence a higher
performance.
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The first set of experiments involves "agents", and was designed to test these two
assumptions. To anticipate our main results, we may say that the second assumption will
be verified, while the first will not.
A second issue we address is the perception that people have of the effect of
monetary compensation on performance. The specific question is motivated by the results
observed in the first set of experiments, which seem to indicate clearly that the offer of a
small compensation may induce a worse performance than the complete absence of
monetary compensation. Do people anticipate this? The second set of experiments,
involving "principals" is designed to test whether they do. As we shall see, the answer of
our experiments is that they do not.
We conducted two different sets of experiments, called the ''IQ experiment'' and the
''donation experiment'', for reasons that will soon be clear.
The IQ experiment.
           The experiment was conducted at the University of Haifa with 160 students
participating in the role of "agents", and 53 in the role of  "principals". The participants
were male and female undergraduate students from all fields of study, with an average age
of 23. We start by describing the procedure for the agents.
At the beginning of the experiment each student in the role of the agent received
an introduction, in which (s)he was told that the experiment would take 45 minutes. They
were also told that they would be asked to answer a quiz consisting of 50 problems taken
out of a psychometric test used to scan candidates to the university. This is a test similar
to the GMAT exam: the participants were told that this is a sort of IQ test. The problems
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in the quiz where chosen to make the probability of a correct answer depend mostly on
effort. In particular, an emphasis was given to questions involving reasoning and
computation rather than general knowledge questions. Each student was then informed
that he would receive 60NIS3 for showing up to the experiment. The instructions are
presented in the Appendix.
We had four different treatments, according to the payment for correct answers.
The payoffs for each correct answer were 0, 0.1, 1, and 3 NIS in treatment 1, 2, 3, and 4
respectively. In each treatment 40 different students participated. After the introduction,
the quiz was distributed. Participants were not allowed to have any material on their tables
except the quiz itself, and were told that only those who would stay until the end of the
experiment would be paid. No clarifying questions by students were allowed during this
time. At the end of the experiment participants were told where and when to come and
pick their earnings.
The 53 students in the role of principals were given a short introduction. In this
introduction they were explained the task that the "agents" participating in treatment 1 and
2 will be given. The principals were also told that they would be paid 1 NIS for every
correct answer that the agent with whom they would be matched would answer in the IQ
test. Then the principals had to choose whether to pay 10 cents or nothing to the agent for
every correct answer (out of the 1NIS they get). They were told that the other person will
know in advance how much he is going to be paid for every correct answer, but that he
will not know that the principal had to chose first whether to pay them 0 or 10 cents. So
the agent would not know that the principal could choose how much to pay him. This was
                                                  
3 At the time of the experiment, 1 NIS was worth approximately  $2.
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the only decision the principals had to make. At the end of the experiment participants
were told where and when to come and pick their earnings.
The donation experiment.
In Israel there are a few "donation days" every year. Each of these days is devoted
to a society, which needs to collect donations from the public for some purpose, like
cancer research, invalid children, etc. In each of these days, high-school students go from
door to door and collect money for that purpose. Normally, the students are organized in
groups according to the class in which they study. The class is divided into couples of
students. Each couple receives coupons, which serves as receipts to the people who
donate money. In the donation mentioned in this experiment each couple received coupons
with the total amount of 500 NIS.
The amount collected by each couple in the donation day depends mostly on the
effort invested: The more houses they visit, the more money they collect. This is especially
true because the students do not have to "sell" the donation, since most people are already
familiar with it. We had 90 high-school students around the age of 16, participating in
three experimental treatments. Each treatment was conducted in two groups of
participants, each with 15 couples. In the discussion that follows we report the two groups
of each treatment together.
In treatment 1a, an experimenter appeared in front of each of the groups and told
them about the importance of the donation they will collect, and that the society is
interested in motivating them to collect as much money as possible. They were told that
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the results of the collection would be published, such that it will be public knowledge how
much money was collected by each couple.
Treatment 1b was done in a similar way, a part from the fact that each couple was
promised 1% of the amount that the two of them would collect. In reatment 1c each
couple was promised 10% of the amount they will collect.
In the donation experiment we also had a group of students that played the role of
"principals". These students were told that they would be matched randomly with one
couple who already collected money, and will be paid 5% of what this couple collected.
The choice that the principals were asked to make was from which group they want us to
choose the couple: from the group that did not receive any payoff (treatment 1a) or from
the group of students who received 1% of what they have collected (treatment 1b). In
other words, we asked them to guess which treatment yields better realizations.
4. RESULTS
In this section we report the results of the experiment and some basic statistics.
The IQ experiment: the agents.









1 49 41 50 81 49 121 50
2 48 42 44 82 47 122 50
3 48 43 44 83 47 123 47
4 45 44 43 84 46 124 45
5 42 45 40 85 46 125 44
6 42 46 39 86 45 126 44
7 42 47 36 87 44 127 44
8 40 48 35 88 44 128 43
9 37 49 35 89 44 129 42
10 37 50 35 90 43 130 41
11 37 51 34 91 41 131 41
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12 37 52 34 92 41 132 39
13 36 53 32 93 41 133 39
14 36 54 32 94 40 134 39
15 36 55 31 95 40 135 38
16 35 56 30 96 38 136 38
17 34 57 26 97 38 137 37
18 34 58 26 98 38 138 37
19 34 59 26 99 38 139 37
20 31 60 26 100 37 140 37
21 31 61 24 101 34 141 37
22 31 62 23 102 33 142 36
23 31 63 23 103 33 143 36
24 29 64 22 104 33 144 34
25 29 65 21 105 31 145 33
26 24 66 21 106 31 146 31
27 23 67 21 107 30 147 31
28 23 68 19 108 29 148 31
29 23 69 19 109 29 149 28
30 22 70 13 110 29 150 27
31 22 71 11 111 28 151 26
32 20 72  8 112 28 152 25
33 20 73  0 113 26 153 25
34 18 74  0 114 23 154 21
35  7 75  0 115 22 155 20
36  3 76  0 116 22 156 20
37  0 77  0 117 22 157 19
38  0 78  0 118 21 158 19
39  0 79  0 119 20 159 17
40  0 80  0 120 17 160 16
Average 28.4 23.075 34.7 34.1
Table 1: The number of correct answers given in the IQ experiment by participants according to
treatments.
We use the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test based on ranks to investigate
whether the sample of correct answers comes from populations with the same median. We
do a pairwise comparison by treatments. The test is appropriate because the distributions
are clearly not normal. In Table 2 we report the test results. A number in the intersection
of row and a column indicates, for the corresponding pair of treatments, the probability of
getting at least an extreme absolute values of the test statistic as we observe, given that








10 cents (treatment 2) .0875 -- --
1 NIS (treatment 3) .0687 .0004 --
3NIS (treatment 4) .0708 .0006 .6964*
Table 2: Mann-Whitney U tests based on ranks with pairwise comparisons of medians of correct answers
by treatment. (Prob. > |z|, where z is the test statistic). The * indicates that for that comparison we cannot
reject (at a .9 level of significance) the hypothesis that the two samples comes from distribution with the
same median.
The observation that the average number of correct answers decreased from 28.4
in the zero marginal payoff treatment to 23.075 when the marginal payoff was 10 cents
seems particularly interesting. The difference between the two distributions is significant,
at a .9 level of significance. When the marginal payoff was 1NIS and 3NIS, the average
number of correct answers were 34.7 and 34.1 respectively. The difference between these
two latter distributions is not significant, again at the  .9 level of significance. Finally, the
distributions in the high marginal payoff treatments (1NIS and 3NIS) are significantly
higher than the distributions of the zero marginal payoff and the 10 cents marginal payoff.
Notice that none of the participants in the high payoff treatments, namely
treatment 3 and 4, answered less than 16 correct answers. We may think that this is the
minimal number of correct answers given by a participant who invest effort in solving the
quiz. We may then wonder if the distribution of correct answer, conditional on investing
effort (that is conditional on answering at least 16 questions) is different in the different
treatments. Accordingly we performed this simple manipulation of the data: drop all
observations in which participants answered less than 16 correct answers, and estimate the
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10 cents (treatment 2) .2633* -- --
1 NIS (treatment 3) .4537* .0680 --
3NIS (treatment 4) .4633* .1029* .6964*
Table 3: Mann-Whitney U tests based on ranks with pairwise comparisons of medians of correct answers
by treatment, after dropping all observations below 16. (Prob. > |z|, where z is the test statistic).  The *
indicates that for that comparison we cannot reject (at a significance level of .1) the hypothesis that the
two samples comes from distribution with the same median.
The average number of correct answers in treatment 1 and 2 under this
manipulation is 33.1 and 30.7 respectively. Of course, nothing is changed in treatments 3
and 4. From comparing the averages and from the results presented in table 3 we see that
the difference between treatment 1 and 2 are much smaller and statistically insignificant. In
fact, the only significant difference now is between treatment 2 and 3.
We conclude from this comparison that much of the difference observed between
treatments is due to participants who decided not to put effort at all in the first two
treatments. Note also that there is a substantial difference in the number of participants
who answered less than 16 correct answers: 6 participants when the marginal payoff was
zero and 11 when the marginal payoff was 10 cents.
A second interesting manipulation of the data is the comparison of the number of
correct answers given by the 10 best participants in each treatment. The results of the








10 cents (treatment 2) .1839* -- --
1 NIS (treatment 3) .1713* .0084 --
3NIS (treatment 4) .2536* .0242 .4654*
Table 4: Mann-Whitney U tests based on ranks with pairwise comparisons of medians of correct answers
by treatment, using only top 10 observations of each treatment. (Prob. > |z|, where z is the test statistic). *
indicates that for that comparison we cannot reject (at a .9 level of significance) the hypothesis that the
two samples comes from distribution with the same median.
The average number of correct answers is 43, 40.1, 45.5, and 45 in treatments 1,
2, 3, and 4 respectively. We conclude from this comparison that differences between
treatments are observed in the top 10 observations as well. In particular, it is not the case
that all the difference between treatments is due to participant who decided not to put
effort at all (participants who answered less than 16 correct answers). Also within the top
10 participants, we observe a treatment effect.
The IQ experiment: the principals.
Now we report the answers of the subjects acting as principals in the IQ
experiment. 46 out of the 53 (87%) subjects chose to pay 10 cents for every correct
answer of the agent. That is, 87% of the participants preferred being matched with an
agent who received a marginal payoff of 10 cents to being matched with an agent who
received no marginal payoff at all. In fact, they are even willing to pay money for that
purpose. This result indicates that the "economic assumption" is widely accepted even
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when, it seems, it should not. People believe that the performance of individuals is
monotonic in the money they receive: the higher the payoff the better the performance will
be, irrespective of the amount. But we have seen that the increase in marginal payoff from
zero to 10 cents actually lowered the number of correct answers given by participants
significantly.
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The donation experiment: the agents.
The amount of money collected by students is reported in Table 5.
10% (treatment 3a) Obs.# 1% (treatment 2a) Obs.# No payment
(treatment 1a)
Obs.#
  0 61    0 31    0 1
  0 62    0 32    0 2
 20 63    0 33    0 3
 20 64    0 34   40 4
 30 65    0 35   80 5
 50 66    0 36 100 6
100 67    0 37 100 7
100 68    0 38 120 8
120 69    0 39 120 9
140 70   30 40 130 10
150 71   50 41 150 11
150 72   80 42 150 12
150 73 100 43 150 13
150 74 120 44 190 14
180 75 150 45 200 15
200 76 150 46 200 16
200 77 150 47 240 17
240 78 180 48 250 18
250 79 210 49 250 19
250 80 230 50 300 20
290 81 240 51 330 21
290 82 240 52 340 22
350 83 250 53 350 23
380 84 250 54 420 24
400 85 250 55 450 25
410 86 300 56 500 26
460 87 330 57 500 27
500 88 400 58 500 28
500 89 400 59 500 29
500 90 500 60 500 30
219.33 153.67 238.67 Average
Table 5: The amount of money collected by students in the donation experiment according to treatments.
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Again, we use the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test based on ranks to
investigate whether the sample of amounts of money donated comes from populations







1%  (treatment 2a) .0977 --
10% (treatment 3a) .7054* .0515
Table 6: Mann-Whitney U tests based on ranks with pairwise comparisons of medians of amounts of
money collected by treatment. (Prob. > |z|, where z is the test statistic). The * indicates that for that
comparison we cannot reject (at a .9 level of significance) the hypothesis that the two samples comes from
distribution with the same median.
We find special interest in the observation that when the payoff is increased from
zero to 1% of the amount collected, the average collection decreased from 238.67 to
153.67. This difference is significant, at a .9 level of significance. When the payoff is
increased to 10% of the amount collected, the average collection is 219.33. The amounts
collected in this treatment is significantly higher than the amounts collected in the 1%
treatment, but not significantly higher than the amounts collected when no payoff was
given.
Like in the IQ experiment, we will perform some simple manipulations of the data.
First, we exclude donations below 100 NIS from the analysis. The results of the test under






1%  (treatment 2a) .7887* --
10% (treatment 3a) .8173* .6037*
Table 7: Mann-Whitney U tests based on ranks with pairwise comparisons of medians of amounts of
money collected by treatment, excluding donation under 100NIS. (Prob. > |z|, where z is the test statistic).
The * indicates that for that comparison we cannot reject (at a .9 level of significance) the hypothesis that
the two samples comes from distribution with the same median.
The average amount collected after dropping all observations below 100 NIS is
281.6, 247.2, and 269.2 in treatments 1a, 1b, and 1c respectively. From table 7 we learn
that the differences between treatments is no longer significant. Again, like in the IQ
experiment, we conclude that much of the difference between treatments is due to people
who invest very little effort or no effort at all.
To be consistent with the manipulations performed in the IQ test, we compare now





1%  (treatment 2a) .0025 --
10% (treatment 3a) .7593* .0042
Table 8: Mann-Whitney U tests based on ranks with pairwise comparisons of medians of amounts of
money collected by treatment, using only top 10 collections in each treatment. (Prob. > |z|, where z is the
test statistic). The  * indicates that for that comparison we cannot reject (at a .9 level of significance) the
hypothesis that the two samples comes from distribution with the same median.
The average donation is 439, 316 and 408 in treatment 1a, 2a, and 3a respectively.
As we see, there is a significant difference between the amounts collected when the payoff
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was 1% and the amounts collected in the other two treatments. Like in the IQ experiment,
this result implies that not all the difference between treatments is due to people who
invest little effort. In particular, the highest collections of are also influenced by the
experimental manipulation.
The donation experiment: the principals
Subjects acting as principals in the donation experiment behaved as the participants
in the IQ experiment. 19 out of the 25 (76%) participants preferred to be matched with an
agent who was paid 1% of the amount he collected. Recall that they had to pay 1% out of
the 5% they received for this choice, while choosing to be matched with an agent that was
not paid cost nothing. Like in the IQ experiment, we find this preferences especially
interesting giving the results of the experiment with the agents.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The subjects in our experiments choose the level of effort they invest in answering
the IQ quiz in one experiment, and in collecting donations in the other. The consequences
of this action are the mild inconvenience, or possibly fun, in providing this effort; the
signal that they receive on their own talent and skill in that particular task; and possibly,
when it is offered, monetary rewards. Once the problem is formulated in these terms, the
observed behavior of the participants in our experiments seems hard to explain. The
addition of a small amount of money should not change the preference over outcomes, and
if money is good, the effort should increase. (Note that this should be true even if subjects
care about the opinion of the experimenter, because they should do so whether a monetary
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reward is offered in addition or not.) In our experiments, on the contrary, the effort
decreases when a small amount of money is added as reward.
Two different environments.
This experimental evidence suggests that the behavior of participants in our
experiments is qualitatively different, depending on whether monetary incentives are used
or not. Probably the most surprising result is the discontinuity of their behavior at the zero
payment.
If we compare the situations in which some amount of money was offered, the
performance improved as this amount increased. But the subjects in the experiments where
no payment is offered, or more precisely no payment is even mentioned, perform better
than the subjects in experiments where a small monetary compensation is offered.
We could not of course run an infinite number of experiments with smaller and
smaller compensations: but it is natural to conjecture that the performance for amounts
even smaller than the 10 cents would be even worse. This behavior would be consistent
with the observed reduction in the level of performance as the amount paid was reduced.
Note that the interesting simple model presented by Frey (1994) and Frey and Oberholzer-
Gee (1997) does not predict this discontinuity. This of course is, strictly speaking, a
technical consequence of the assumption of continuous preferences. A slightly different
model, with a discontinuity at zero of the utility function would fit the data: but this would
seem to be an artificial model.
 It seems that the environment in which subjects were performing their activity
(solving IQ quiz or collecting money for charitable institutions) was perceived in different
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ways, depending on whether monetary compensation was offered or not. Whenever a
monetary incentive was presented, the environment of the experiment was perceived as a
monetary environment. When no monetary compensation was offered, or even mentioned,
the environment was perceived as non-monetary. In the two cases we have two different
curves of response of performance to monetary compensation.
Positive effects of the compensation in monetary environments.
Conditional on the perception that the environment was a monetary environment,
however, the effect of monetary incentives is unambiguously positive: a larger monetary
incentive improves the performance. In particular we could not find evidence of two
positive levels of monetary compensation, where the performance with the higher
compensation was lower. In fact it is surprising how effective the compensation is. For
example in the IQ experiment moving from 10 cents to 1NIS seems enough to extract the
maximum effort from the participants. We conclude that there are two distinct reaction
curves: one describes the effort provided by people facing a monetary reward of different
amount, and the other the (constant) effort provided by people that had no promise of
monetary compensation. A precise estimate of these two curves is difficult, but we know
that in the IQ experiments they cross at some amount between 10 cents and 1NIS.
Incentives and effort.
In our experiments we can measure the performance, not the effort that subjects
put into the activity. Inspection of the data suggests the conjecture that subjects use a
bang-bang procedure: they decide to put effort or not, and the incentives are effective
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because they shift the subjects from a no-effort to an effort mode. To test this conjecture
we analyzed the distribution of the performance above a given level. We tried to choose
this level as the one achieved by a subject who is devoting at least a minimal effort to the
task. The results are consistent with the bang-bang hypothesis both in the case of the IQ
test experiments and in the donation experiments.
How small is a small amount? The fair wage hypothesis.
In our experiments the subjects who are paid 10 cents of a NIS for each right
answer give a worse performance than those who are not paid at all.  10 cents may sound a
very small compensation, almost “insulting’’.  While we believe that there is some truth in
the intuition behind the word insulting, we also think that this is precisely what may be
important in our results. Insulting compensations are not necessarily and always small
compensations. The important fact is that the amount of money offered changes in a
significant way the perception that the subjects have of “what the contract is about’’. In
particular it is not safe to assume that adding an incentive leaves the utility of the other
incentives unchanged. A certain amount of monetary compensation may be perceived as
too small when compared to the rest of the relevant factors, even if not too small in itself.
We may think of real life situations where a non-trivial amount of money may sound
disproportionately small compared to other factors. For instance, an increase in salary by
two hundred dollars per month to a professor, as a compensation for a smaller office, may
be worse than no compensation. This factor is likely to be more important when factors
like health or reputation are at stake. So while in our experiments it is clear that ‘’too
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small’’ is somewhere between 10 cents and 1 NIS, the exact determination of this quantity
in experimental or real-life situations is likely to be difficult and subtle.
How a principal perceives a contract.
In a second set of experiments we tried to test what is the perception that people
have of the effect of monetary incentives on others. We did this by setting subjects as
principals, paid according to the performance of agents. Agents were the subjects in the
IQ experiments and the donation experiments that we have just described. Principals had
to decide whether to offer a monetary compensation or not: this compensation was
subtracted from their payoff.
We find that the subjects acting as principals make the wrong choice. They offer a
compensation that reduces their payoff in two distinct ways. First, because they have to
pay, and second because they are reducing the performance of their agents.
It is natural to explain the behavior of the principals with an argument similar to
the one used to explain the behavior of the agents. Since they are offered the choice
between a positive compensation and zero compensation, they perceive the environment
as a monetary environment, and apply the "universal" rule that a larger compensation
induces a better performance. Our results show that this rule is in effect justified, once the
environment is recognized as a monetary environment. But the subjects fail to recognize
the discontinuity in the behavior of their "agents". It is precisely this subtler phenomenon
that seems not to be widely recognized.
Changes of preferences.
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The results of our experiments might alternatively be explained in a simple, rational
model of learning, as follows. Agents at the beginning of the experiments consider two
states of nature as possible: one in which the activity will be performed in exchange for
money, and the other in which it will not. Their preferences are defined over effort,
money, and any other aspect of the outcome (as the opinion of the experimenters), and are
different in the two states. Finally, upon receiving instructions subjects update their belief,
and act accordingly. Clearly any amount of monetary compensation will be sufficient to
inform them that the environment is monetary, and the true state is the first state.
This model explains the observed discontinuity. It is however very artificial,
particularly in the second assumption: the utility of consequences is state dependent. In
addition it has, potentially, a different major difficulty that we illustrate with a conjecture
that we plan to test in future research.
Take the participants of the IQ quiz experiment, where 10 cents have been offered
per each question answered correctly, and in a second experiment ask them to perform the
same task, for no compensation. We conjecture that the performance will be worse than
the one of subjects who have been offered zero compensation from the start, and of course
worse than the performance of the same participants in the first experiment. This behavior
would not be consistent with the model we have just discussed. Rather, it seems to
suggest that as long as no monetary compensation is announced, subjects are unaware of
this possibility. We conjecture that the perception of subjects of the contract changes
during the experiment. As we mentioned earlier, it would be interesting to determine if the
perception of the task or rather the perception of the environment changes. This seems
possible to test experimentally, by performing the same experiment we have just described,
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but changing the task. More complex, and more interesting, is to determine the change in
performance induced by a protracted offer of a money reward, but, as we said, this is topic
for future research.
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Appendix: Instruction for the IQ experiment
Introduction
The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully you may earn a
considerable amount of money. The experiment would take about 45 minutes.
In the experiment you are asked to answer a quiz of 50 problems taken out of a
psychometric test used to scan candidates to the university. This is a sort of an IQ test.
You will be paid 60NIS for showing up to the experiment. {The following
sentence was not included in treatment 1: ‘’ In addition, you will be paid 0.1NIS’’ (in
treatment 2, 1NIS in treatment 3 and 2NIS in treatment 4) for every correct answer you
will give.}
The money will be paid to you, privately and in cash, at the end of the experiment.
Do you have any question?
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10 cents (treatment 2) .0381 -- --
1 NIS (treatment 3) .0146 .0003 --
3NIS (treatment 4) .0339 .0008 .4222*







10 cents (treatment 2) .0299 -- --
1 NIS (treatment 3) .0120 .0000 --
3NIS (treatment 4) .0270 .0001 .7552*
